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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In re the Matter of the Estate of 
RAYMA LYNNETTE PERCELL, deceased 
DIANA LYNN LOHMAN, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
vs. 
GALEN HEADLEY, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
Court of Appeals No.: 20110651-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) and UTAH CODE A N N . §78A-4-103(2)(j) provide this Court with 
jurisdiction over this appeal. This appeal is from the Order on Motion for Delivery of Property 
(hereinafter "Order") entered by the Seventh District Court, San Juan County, on July 20, 
2011, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT 
OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court sufficiently weigh the evidence against Headley }spresumption of ownership 
of the Tractor? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by Lohman's filing of a Motion for Delivery of 
Property on February 7, 2011, to which Headley objected, claiming ownership of several items 
of personal property. R046-082. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We review a trial courtfs findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard and will not upset them unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made...." State v. BirkelancL 2011 UT App 227, f7, 258 P.3d 662, citing 
State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah Ct.App.1992). 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court sufficiently considering Headley ys belief of ownership when applying the 
equitable ownership test? 
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved by Lohman's filing a Motion for Delivery of 
Property on February 7, 2011, to which Headley objected, claiming ownership of several items 
of personal property. R046-082. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, 
we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made.'" State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App., 106, If 10, 999 P.2d 1252, citing 
Spanish Fork City v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61,1J5, 975 P.2d 501 (citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. UTAH C O D E A N N . §75-3-708 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
Rayma Percell (hereinafter "Percell") passed away on December 13, 2009, at the age 
of seventy (70). Her daughter Diana Lohman (hereinafter "Lohman"), filed an Application 
for Informal Probate in the Seventh Judicial District Court of San Juan County on March 1, 
2010. R i l l . Lohman was appointed as Personal Representative for the Estate on March 22, 
2010. RlOl. Galen Headley, (hereinafter "Headley") was Percell's romantic partner of 
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eighteen (18) years at the time of her passing. On September 13, 2010, he filed a Petition for 
Extension of Time to Elect Spousal Share and a Petition for Judicial Declaration of Common Eaw 
Marriage in Case No. 104700052 in the Seventh Judicial District. R100. In the companion 
case, the Court later found that no common law marriage existed; therefore, Headley allowed 
the time for filing an Election for Spousal Share to expire. R083-084. 
Meanwhile, Lohman filed a Motion for Delivery of Property on February 7, 2011, to which 
Headley objected, claiming ownership of several items of personal property. R046-082. On 
June 13, 2011 the juvenile court, issued its oral decision at a hearing and thereafter entered 
its final Order R021-023. On July 20, 2011, the Court entered its Order, which granted the 
Tractor to Lohman. On July 21, 2011, the Court entered its Order, denying Headley's Motion 
for Stay Pending Appeal and ordering that the Tractor be immediately delivered to Lohman. 
Headley timely filed his Notice of Appealwith the Utah Supreme Court on July 21, 2011. 
R006. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court on July 28, 2011, pursuant 
to UT. R. APP. P. 42(A). On December 29, 2011, Headley filed the Opening Brief of his 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, to which Lohman now responds. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Percell and Headley began dating in 1991, the same year in which they began 
designing the Cadillac Ranch RV Park ("Cadillac Ranch"). Tr. at pp. 53, 65-67, 93-94. In 
1992, Headley began living with Percell in her home. Tr. at pp. 37, 65-67, 106.1. At a later 
point, Percell conveyed her home into joint tenancy with Headley. Tr. at p. 20. Since he 
began dating Percell, Headley helped support her financially. Tr. at pp. 66-67.1. Their 
finances quickly became intertwined as they shared joint banking accounts, joindy remodeled 
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a house together, and owned two properties jointly, but Percell remained the sole owner of 
Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at pp. 20, 38, 68. 
In 1995, Headley researched and picked out a used 975 Massey Ferguson 180 Tractor 
("Tractor") that he and Percell had agreed would be used for Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at pp. 68-
69.1, 101. On November 29, 1995, Percell signed a Retail Purchase Order for the Tractor 
and implements ("Bill of Sale"), which lists only her name as the owner of the Tractor. Tr. 
at p. 69, Exhibit 1.1. Percell paid the initial $3950 with a personal check and the remaining 
$10,000 with a cashier's check. Tr. at p. 25. Percell paid taxes on the Tractor from 1995-
1997, but otherwise did not use it, spend money on it, or put in any time on the Tractor. Tr. 
at pp. 39, 40-41.1, 72-87,105-106, Exhibits 3-7.1. 
At trial on June 13, 2011, Lohman testified that she knew of the Tractor in question, 
gave the exact date of its purchase as November 29, 1995, and stated that she believed the 
Tractor was bought for maintenance of Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at pp. 24-25. When asked about 
how Percell purchased the Tractor, Lohman testified that she had recently asked the 
company that sold the Tractor for its records, and showed that Percell made a down 
payment by check of $3950 and then used a cashier's check for the remaining $10,000. Tr. 
at p. 25. Lohman testified that three days before Percell passed away, "she was still sayin', 
That is my tractor.'" Id. 
Headley owned Juanco, a construction company and often used the tractor at issue 
herein for his construction business. Tr. at pp. 20-21. Headley testified that he had no 
documentation and that he had never made any kind of use, rental, or lease agreements on 
the Tractor to Percell. Tr. at p. 57. He testified he only paid the expenses for the operation 
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of the Tractor. Id. He testified that he had picked out the tractor for the purpose of 
completing and perfecting Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at p. 69. He testified that Percell had signed 
the purchase order for the tractor because at the time he was working many hours a day and 
that she was capable of using the Tractor. Tr. at pp. 69-70. Two (2) checks were presented 
at trial one (1) in the amount of $345.83 from Juanco Construction to Percell with a memo 
line for a tractor payment and another check in the amount of $1037.49 to Percell for tractor 
payments written on the memo line. Tr. at pp. 70-71. Headley testified he believed that 
these were payments to pay off the money that was borrowed to originally purchase the 
Tractor, thus he was paying it back to Percell. Tr. at p. 71. Headley also testified that he 
made additional payments for the Tractor but did not have documentation showing such. 
Tr. at p. 72. 
Headley testified and presented documentation that he had paid taxes on the Tractor 
since 2002. Tr. at p. 73. Three (3) checks for insurance on the Tractor were presented for 
the years 1996, 1998, and 1999, which were paid by Headley. Id. Headley testified that he 
was sure he had paid insurance in other years as well. Tr. at p. 74. Headley indicated that as 
far as he knew that he paid about $200 a year in insurance on the Tractor from 1995-2009. 
Id. Headley testified that he had purchased numerous implements for the Tractor and at 
least one (1) of the implements cost approximately $2800. Tr. at pp. 75-76. He testified that 
he also bought implements for the amount of $200, wheel weights for $300, tires for the 
Tractor for $170.09, and wheel weights for $651.45. Tr. at pp. 76-78. He testified that he 
had spent at least $2800 in implements and tires as well as another $2800 for an earth mover 
implement. Tr. at p. 78. When Headley was asked why he had spent so much money on the 
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Tractor he testified it was because he owned it and because such items were necessary for 
the work to be done at Cadillac Ranch and with Juanco Construction. Tr. at p. 79. Headley 
testified that the Tractor was a 1975 and needed repairs, that he had rebuilt the entire 
Tractor. Id. 
Headley then testified regarding the costs of numerous repairs he had made on the 
Tractor. Tr. at p. 80. Two (2) invoices were presented for the amounts of $271, $2436, and 
$45 for the repair of piston and sleeves. Tr. at pp. 80-81. Headley presented other checks as 
exhibits for the amounts of $11, $81, $130, $4745, $1335.23, and $5700 all for repairs or 
implements to the Tractor. Tr. at p. 82-84. Headley testified that with everything he had 
likely paid approximately $17,000 for minor and major repairs to the Tractor. Tr. at p. 85. 
Evidence was then presented that documentation existed for $1400 in Tractor payments, 
$700 in insurance, $1,600 in tires and implements, $17,000 in major and minor repairs, 
indicating that Headley had put in at least $21,000 into the Tractor. Tr. at p. 86. Headley 
then testified that he had paid approximately another $6,000 into the Tractor but that he did 
not have documentation to evidence these payments. Tr. at p 87. 
At trial on June 13, 2011, the Court asked Headley whether he had specifically given 
Percell money to acquire the Tractor. Headley responded that he had not. Tr. at p. 55. 
Headley testified in length about the repairs he made to the Tractor and the expenses 
associated with them, but he clarified for the Court that he made no payments to Percell for 
use of the Tractor. Tr. at pp. 56-57. When questioned about whether all of the receipts 
showing repairs were for the Tractor in question, Headley did admit to owning another 
Tractor as well. Tr. at p. 92. Headley testified that before Percell bought the Tractor, they 
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had a conversation about who would own it, but when pressed for details of what was said, 
Headley could not remember and just said that they decided they were going to buy the 
Tractor for Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at pp. 102-103. On June 8, 2011 at her Deposition, Lohman 
testified that before her death, Percell and Lohman made a verbal agreement about which 
possessions the grandkids would get. Dep. at pp. 14-15. No such agreement was ever made, 
however, about who would get the Tractor. Id. 
When asked whether he thought, at the time of purchase, that he and Percell jointly 
owned the Tractor, Headley stated that, "[i]t belonged to Cadillac Ranch." Tr. at p. 101. 
Headley was then asked what part of Cadillac Ranch he owns, to which he replied that he 
never had owned any of it in the past or at present. Tr. at p. 103. This statement clarified his 
earlier one in which he had said he felt he owned the Tractor from the beginning because it 
was purchased for Cadillac Ranch, which he believed to be a joint operation. Tr. at p. 92-93. 
Headley refuted Lohman's claim that Percell had a final say on everything at Cadillac Ranch, 
but his belief of it being a joint venture is not verified by any documents. Tr. at p. 95. 
At the end of the trial on June 13, 2011, the trial court awarded Lohman the Tractor, 
stating that the weight of the evidence indicates that the Tractor was purchased for use on 
Percell's ranch. Tr. at p. 124. The Court indicated that because there is no evidence of an 
oral or written agreement between Percell and Headley, the Court must consider Percell's 
desires only to the extent to which they are explained in her will. Tr. at pp. 124-125. The 
Court concluded that if no agreement was made about Headley becoming the owner, then 
he may not simply assume he is the owner because of the work and money he put into the 
Tractor. Instead, the fact that Percell never agreed to sell the Tractor to Headley is the most 
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salient point for the Court to consider. Tr. at p. 125. For these reasons, the Court found that 
the Tractor was property of Percell's estate and ordered that it be transferred to Lohman. Id. 
SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT 
The standard of proof to overcome proof of ownership by duly executed written 
documentation is clear and convincing. Hanks v. Hales. 411 P.2d 836, 838 fn. 4 (Utah 
1966). The trial court in this matter determined ownership of the Tractor based upon the 
Bill of Sale and proof of duly executed written documentation that Lohman owned the 
Tractor. Headley challenges this concept based on an equitable ownership argument; 
however, he has failed to properly marshal the evidence to allow such a claim to be 
addressed by this Court. See, UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9); see also, State in Interest of PJNL 2011 
UT App 221, Tf2, 262 P.3d 429. Headley has thereby waived his right to have this issue 
heard on appeal. 
Alternatively, Headley has failed to indicate how the trial court below did not 
sufficiently weigh the evidence presented. Headley failed to present adequate evidence 
below to reach the heightened standard of clear and convincing, even in his position of 
equitable ownership, and simply seeks to have this Court rehear the matter. However, this 
Court has clearly indicated that, "[w]e review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard and will not upset them unless they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made...." State v. Birkeland. 2011 UT App 227, f7, 258 P.3d 662, citing 
State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Headley has failed to meet his 
burden for relief in this matter. 
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Headley's position relies heavily on his own belief that he owned the Tractor at issue 
herein; however, this Court has indicated that belief is not determinative. See, Betenson v. 
Call Auto and Equipment Sales. Inc.. 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982). Percell left no evidence 
suggesting that she intended Headley to possess the Tractor after her death. R i l l . There is 
no mention of the Tractor in her will and she did not orally agree to transfer her ownership 
of it to Headley at any point. Tr. at 102-103. In fact, Lohman testified that three (3) days 
before Percell passed away she was still claiming the Tractor was hers, not Headley's. Tr. at 
p. 25. Headley's belief is additionally insufficient to overcome these factors, particularly 
when combined with the written documentation. 
Thus, Headley has either failed to adequately marshal the evidence and has thus 
waived his right to raise any challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence or, alternatively, he 
has failed to meet his burden to show that the sparse "evidence" he presented in the form of 
his own belief is sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard afforded to 
rebut the written documentation in this matter. Either way, Headley is not entitled to the 
relief he seeks in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE WAS AGAINST HEADLEY'S PRESUMPTION 
OF OWNERSHIP IN THE TRACTOR. 
In Hanks v. Hales, the Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows: 
The rule that written documents duly executed are endowed with a 
presumption of validity and will be given effect unless overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence is supported by innumerable cases. Some examples from 
this court are: Universal C L T. Credit Corp. v. Nelson et al.,\l Utah 2d 280, 409 
P.2d 615, where defendant had signed an indemnity agreement but was 
relieved of liability because indemnitee had not made full disclosure. The court 
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recogni2ed that to overcome the effect of the signed document the proof 'must be shown by 
clear and convincing evidence\ in Beehive Security Co. v. Bush, 16 Utah 2d 328, 400 
P.2d506. 
Ibid, 411 P.2d 836, 838 fn. 4 (Utah 1966) (emphasis added). This case demonstrates that an 
establish standard of clear and convincing evidence has been set forth in Utah in order to 
rebut written documentation of ownership. 
In Stewart v. Commerce Ins. Co. of Glen Falls. N.Y.. the Utah Supreme Court 
declined to follow its previous decision of Jackson v. James, and stated as follows: 
Defendant upon this appeal relies chiefly upon its defense that tide to the 
automobile passed to Spackman and therefore the estate had no insurable 
interest in it at the time of the accident. In support of its argument, defendant 
cites the recent case of Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P.2d 235 wherein we 
held that the statute did not prevent an inter vivos gift from husband to wife 
even though there was failure to comply with the statutory registration 
requirements. 
- While in that case it was held that title could pass without having complied with all the 
necessary statutory steps, the rule announced in that case is not controlling here. This case 
presents a different factual picture and there are other statutes of this state 
which are involved in this litigation and which were not involved in the 
decision of that case. 
Ibid, 198 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1948)(emphasis added). 
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) requires in relevant part that, "[a] party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence ithat supports the challenged finding." In State 
in Interest of P.N, discusses the marshaling requirement as follows: 
To properly discharge this marshaling duty, P.N. must "present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [P.N.] resists." State v. 
Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, Tfl7, 196 P.3d 124 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have 
his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal." State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 
1185,1189-90 (Utah Ct.App.1993). 
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Ibil, 2011 UT App 221,1J2,262 P.3d 429. 
In his brief, Headley heavily relies on the Jackson decision when arguing that a 
presumption of ownership may be rebutted by legally relevant evidence. Headley's brief fails 
to note, however, that shortly after the Utah Supreme Court issued the Jackson decision it 
distinguished such decision from Stewart and indicated that the facts of the two cases were 
too different for Jackson to be reasonably applied. 
This matter likewise differentiates from Jackson because its facts differ substantially 
from the facts of the Jackson case. For instance, in Jackson, the husband and wife were 
legally married, unlike Percell and Headley. In Jackson the issue was the gifting of an 
automobile from the husband to the wife as a wedding present before it was registered. This 
is not the case in this matter. The issue of not being married calls into question the 
relevance of Jackson because in Jackson the Court allowed the transfer of ownership based 
on the marital relationship between the husband and wife. The Court allowed evidence of 
the deceased's intent to give the car to his wife to replace the need of proof of ownership by 
a bill of sale mainly by defining the transfer of ownership as an inter vivos gift from husband 
to wife. No gifting exists in the instant matter. 
Another important difference between this matter is the fact that in Jackson, the wife 
lacked proof of the bill of sale and so the Court allowed the transfer of ownership to occur 
despite not having it. In this matter, the bill of sale is evident and clearly shows Percell as the 
Tractor's owner. Jackson did not grant the Court permission to ignore a bill of sale, but 
rather allowed other evidence to be considered in its place. Based upon these significant 
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differences, the rule in Jackson is irrelevant and should not be considered as precedent for 
this Court to follow in the instant matter. 
In his brief, Headley erroneously claims that Lohman's counsel asked the trial court 
to not weigh the evidence and to only consider the bill of sale. Brief of Appellant at p. 21. 
However, the actual quote from his brief shows this is not what occurred. It states as 
follows: 
Now, the tractor, one of the—one of the things Fd like to draw the court's 
attention to, we have a bill of—a bill of sale from the tractor things showing 
that she paid $14,000 . . . for the tractor. He shows some payments on the 
thing, but he also indicates, "I've been the one that's been primarily using it 
for all these things for all these years." But the telling thing about this is this: 
he doesn't say, "I went and bought the tractor." He doesn't show that he has 
receipts for it. He says, "I paid insurance and stuff . . . . 
Tr. at 114-115 (emphasis added). Headley's evidence was duly brought forth throughout the 
trial and considered by the Court. However, none of the evidence he presented showed that 
he had purchased the tractor or that he Percell had ever given him any ownership interest in 
the Tractor. His evidence only shows that he paid for maintenance, taxes, and some loan 
payments on the Tractor not that he had any ownership in the Tractor itself other than his 
claim it was purchased for Cadillac Ranch which he believed was a joint venture although no 
evidence was presented to prove this claim. 
Headley also relies on the case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Group to show the "equitable ownership balancing test" relied on by Utah Courts. Ibid., 868 
P.2d 110 (Utah App. 1994). Headley indicates that this court relied upon eight (8) factors in 
making the determination as to what is an equitable owner. Headley presumes these factors 
include, (1) acquiesce by the seller; (2) possession; (3) exclusive use; (4) intent to purchase; 
1 ^ 
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(5) payment/value; (6) tide/application for tide; (7) control; and (8) insurance. Appellant's 
Brief %X p. 18. Headley also sets forth nine (9) factors, many of which are contained in the 
Allstate matter, in support of his position that he had equitable ownership of the Tractor. 
These factors are not included in one specific case but have been pulled from several 
different matters, and include: (1) possession; (2) agreement or intent to purchase which can 
be established through acquiescence; (3) exclusive use; (4) payment or value exchanged; (5) 
title or application for title if applicable; (6) insurance or application for insurance; (7) 
control; (8) bill of sale; and (9) third-party security interests. Brief of Appellant at pp. 15-16. 
However, while Headley argues that he has met six (6) of the nine (9) factors for equitable 
ownership and that two (2) factors do not apply, leaving only the bill of sale as not being 
met, Headley has not met all of these factors and has not shown that he had equitable 
ownership in the Tractor. Brief of Appellant at pp. 24-25. 
Headley has not produced any agreement or shown he had any intent to purchase the 
tractor even through acquiescence while he did use the tractor; no agreement has been 
produced that shows that he was to have the Tractor or that he intended to purchase the 
Tractor. Headley testified at trial that he had made some payments to Percell for what he 
believed was the Tractor, but could not establish where the money actually went. He did not 
make any payments to Percell for use of the tractor like rental payments, making it axiomatic 
that Percell simply let him use the Tractor. Percell may have let him use the Tractor but no 
evidence has been produced to show that she intended to give it to Headley with or without 
an agreement, thus he cannot show that he intended to purchase the Tractor or that any 
agreement regarding such exists. 
1 o 
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Headley testified that he could not recall any conversation with Percell in which it 
was determined the Tractor was owned jointly or who would own the Tractor upon either 
party's death and he testified that he only recalled the Tractor being bought for Cadillac 
Ranch, to move dirt and reslope surfaces. His use of the Tractor at Cadillac Ranch is no 
different than an employee using equipment that belongs to the company. It appears that 
Percell bought the Tractor to use on the Ranch and that was its purpose, just because 
Headley is likely the only one who used it does not mean he had exclusive use of it especially 
when Percell paid for it and bought it for use at the Ranch. Headley has not presented any 
evidence the he jointly owned the Tractor, or Cadillac Ranch and thus his use is nothing 
different than an employee using equipment that the business owns. Thus, he has not 
shown exclusive use. 
As is set forth supra Headley never made any payments for the use of the Tractor and 
what little money could be shown to have been paid to Percell allegedly for Tractor 
payments cannot be proven to have actually paid for the Tractor, thus leaving no proof he 
was going to purchase the Tractor from Percell. He put in money for repairs, implements, 
and some insurance but never made rental payments to Percell for use of the Tractor. Thus, 
he has not met the criteria for payments on the Tractor. 
Headley also did not present any evidence that he had title or had made application 
for the title to the Tractor. Headley only presented evidence that he had paid the amount of 
$665 towards insurance for the Tractor; however, this amount is not the total amount for 
insuring the Tractor over the years, and likely only represents a small amount of money paid 
towards the insurance premiums on the Tractor, thus while Headley has paid some amount 
1 A 
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of insurance on the Tractor he has not made all the payments and thus cannot use such 
minimal payments to obtain equitable ownership. 
Furthermore as is argued above, while Headley may have had control over using the 
Tractor on Cadillac Ranch, his use of the Tractor was on the Ranch with a Tractor that had 
been purchased for the Ranch thus allowing him to simply use equipment owned by the 
Ranch. This does not give him control over the Tractor for the basis of equitable 
ownership. Headley also has no bill of sale showing he ever bought the Tractor or part of 
the Tractor. 
Further, Headley also failed to adequately marshal the evidence in this matter. While 
his brief does contain much of the evidence he presented at trial regarding his belief that he 
owned the Tractor and the monies he has put into the Tractor, it fails to point out the 
testimony presenting the fact that the Tractor was bought and belonged to Cadiallac Ranch, 
that Percell never told him nor Lohman who was to have the Tractor upon her death, or that 
the money Headley paid to Percell that he alleges were to pay for the loan on the Tractor 
cannot be shown to have been used to pay for the Tractor, etc. Thus, Headley's challenge 
to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the Tractor cannot be considered on appeal 
absent appropriate marshaling. 
In the end, the trial court decided it lacked sufficient evidence by the clear and 
convincing standard to determine that Headley owned the Tractor through equitable 
ownership, and thus awarded the tractor to Lohman. As Headley has not presented 
evidence to show how he meets most of the factors he sets forth from numerous unrelated 
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cases in his brief, even the concept of equitable ownership is unavailable to him. This Court 
should thus decline to grant him the relief he requests on appeal. 
II. T H E TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY CONSIDERED HEADLEVS 
PERSONAL BELIEF OF OWNERSHIP WHEN APPLYING T H E 
EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP TEST. 
In his brief, Headley claims that there is no Utah case law concerning belief of 
ownership simply because none of the case law specifically concerns automobiles. Brief at 
p. 20. Although that may be true, it is more important to look at the case law about the 
connection between belief and ownership that does exist in Utah rather than relying on case 
law outside this jurisdiction. For example, in Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales. 
Inc.. the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following: 
Even if the plaintiffs believed defendant Barlow's representations, their beliefs 
are not determinative of their status. A party's belief that he has purchased the 
Brooklyn Bridge will not strengthen his claim of ownership. Even the use of 
the words "joint venture" in a contract will not be found determinative if the 
elements of a joint venture are missing. See, e.g., Ugnell v. Berg, Utah, 593 P.2d 
800 (1979). 
Ibid., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982)(emphasis added). Clearly, just because a person wants to 
believe that he or she owns something does not translate into ownership. It should also be 
noted that Headley cites South Carolina's Tollison v. Reaves as a relevant case because it 
upholds the idea that belief of ownership should be considered when applying the equitable 
ownership test. In Unisun Ins. Co. v. First Southern Ins. Co.. however, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court changed its position on the matter, stating as follows: 
In previous cases concerning ownership for purposes of insurance coverage, 
this Court has relied upon the definitions and requirements of Tide 56. See, 
e.g., Tollison v. Reaves, 277 S.C. 443, 289 S.E.2d 163 (1982) (relying largely on 
Tide 56 definitions of "owner" to determine ownership for purposes of 
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insurance coverage). Certainly, the definitions in Title 56 constitute strong 
persuasive authority when construing terms contained in insurance policies. 
Nevertheless, the Title 56 definitions are not binding for purposes of 
insurance coverage. Indeed, the plain language of the statute limits the 
application of the definitional section to Article One of Title 56. Article One of 
Title 56 primarily concerns procedures relating to the licensing of motor 
vehicle drivers. It does not govern coverage under automobile insurance 
policies. For that reason, notwithstanding our reliance on the definition of 
"owner" in Title 56, we have always held that ownership is a question of fact 
for purposes of coverage under insurance policies. See, e.g., South Carolina Fatvn 
bureau v. Scott, 21A S.C. 264, 262 S.E.2d 739 (1980) (noting ownership for 
purposes of "newly acquired automobile" clause of insurance policy is to be 
decided by reference to the particular facts and circumstances of the case). 
Similarly, whether a lessee is an owner under a particular automobile insurance 
policy is a question of fact that depends on the specific facts and 
circumstances of the case in question. Consequently, the Court of Appeals 
erred in finding that for purposes of insurance coverage a lessee cannot be an 
owner as a matter of law. 
Ibid., 462 S.E.2d 260, 262 (South Carolina 1995)(emphasis added). 
In Estate of Harris v. Harris, the Tenth Circuit Court has stated that, "the 
presumption [of ownership] is easily enough rebutted by evidence such as a bill of sale." 
Ibid., 218 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2000). In re Ozey. the United States Bankruptcy Court 
looks at the importance of documentation when determining ownership: 
Defendants are correct in that although not conclusive, a certificate of 
documentation is prima facie evidence of ownership. 46 U.S.C. §12104 (1992). 
The underlying sale of the vessel is also indicative of ownership. In re Banner 
Yachts, Inc., 144 B.R. 985 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1992); Chase Manhattan Fin. Servs., 
Inc. v. McMillian, 896 F.2d 452 (10th Cir.1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Vest Transp. Co., Inc., 666 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.1982); Meacham Corp. v. United 
States, 207 F.2d 535 (4th Cir.1953), cert, dismd., 348 U.S. 801, 75 S.Ct. 17, 99 
L.Ed. 633 (1954); JTT Indus. Credit Co. v. M/V Richard C, 617 F.Supp. 761 
(E.D.La.1985). 
In this case, the certificate of documentation along with the evidence that the 
bill of sale for the ERSAN was made to Ersan Resources, Dundar used the 
corporate form for his benefit, and the clear language of the statute and 
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application forms necessitate holding Dundar to his placement of ownership 
of the yachts in the corporation. 
Ibid., 172 B.R. 83, 96-97 (Bankruptcy Court 1994)(footnote omitted). This case has the 
obvious difference of a party trying to deny ownership, rather than claim it. Its reasoning, 
however, remains relevant to this matter because in both instances, the bill of sale for the 
property in question plays a central role. 
In Stone v. Flint, the Utah Court of Appeals has recently stated as follows: 
Because the Bill of Sale was signed on the date the two-acre homesite was sold 
to Defendants, and was intended to memorialize the already agreed-upon 
transfer of personal property, the address in the Bill of Sale unambiguously 
related to the two acres Defendants purchased. Therefore, the trial court did 
not err in determining that the terms of the REPC and Bill of Sale were clear 
and unambiguous. 
Ibid, 2010 UT App. 199,1J5, 238 P.3d 70 (footnotes omitted). 
As noted in the trial for this instant matter, Percell left no evidence suggesting that 
she intended Headley to possess the Tractor after her death. Rl 11. There is no mention of 
the Tractor in her will and she did not orally agree to transfer her ownership of it to Headley 
at any point. Tr. at 102-103. In fact, Lohman testified that three (3) days before Percell 
passed away she was still claiming the Tractor was hers, not Headley's. Tr. at p. 25. The only 
documentation that exists about the ownership of the Tractor is the undisputed bill of sale 
that shows Percell as the sole purchaser of the Tractor. Headley tried to claim that he had 
made payments on the tractor to Percell, but as was pointed out in the trial, there is no 
evidence that the money from Headley's checks to Percell was used towards the payment of 
the Tractor. Tr. at pp. 56-57. 
Headley's brief tries to assert that he deserves to be the Tractor's owner because he 
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put so much of his time and money in repairing it over the years, because he decided to pay 
taxes on it for a time, and because he used it so extensively. Brief of Appellant at p. 26. 
Those factors shed light on Headley's belief of ownership, but not on Percell's. Headley had 
ample opportunity to discuss with Percell who owned the Tractor, but he never did. He 
testified, in fact, that the only discussion he recalls about it was when it was about to be 
purchased and they determined it would be for Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at 102-103. Headley also 
testified that he had never legally owned part of Cadillac Ranch. Tr. at p. 103. Yet again, 
Headley's testimony shows that he chose to ignore the documentation that shows Percell as 
its sole owner and wished Cadillac Ranch to be considered a joint venture despite there 
being no documentation to prove his claim. Tr. at p. 95. 
As Ozey attests, documentation that proves ownership cannot be glibly overlooked. 
Headley tries to do precisely that in objecting to the trial court's ruling against his 
presumption of ownership. Thus, Headley has not shown a presumption of ownership or 
equitable ownership in and to the tractor and therefore, the trial court was correct in 
awarding the tractor to Lohman and Percell's estate. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Lohman respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the Order subject of this appeal on the basis that Headley has failed to meet his 
appellate burden of marshaling and, alternatively, that this trial court sufficiendy weighed the 
evidence and determined the matter. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2012. 
Craig C. Halls 
Attorney for Diane Lohman 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
In the Matter of the Estate of DELIVERY OF PROPERTY 
RAYMA LYNNETTE PERCELL, 
Case No. 1037-10 
Deceased. Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
This matter came on for hearing on the 13th day of June, 2011. Diana Lohman, personal 
representative of the estate, was present and represented by counsel Craig C. Halls. Gaylen 
Headley was present and represented by counsel Christina Sloan. The court having heard 
testimony and various stipulations of the parties, and having been asked to determine ownership 
of guns, a table and a tractor, makes the following findings of fact: 
1. Court finds that Gaylen Headley did not establish ownership of the guns. And it is 
easy for the court to determine that the three guns in question; the model 94 Winchester 30-30, a 
.22 revolver and a .22 pistol with white handles, are the property of the estate of Rayma Percell. 
2. The evidence before the court indicates that the parties may have purchased the 
Stormy Red Door coffee table together, thereby this property was owned as joint property and is 
owned one half by each. 
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3. With regard :o the Tractor the greatest weight of the initial evidence establishes that 
Rayma Percell bough: me Tractor. 
This court g-r e Gaylen Headley an opportunity to indicate that he had transferred or 
given the Tractor :c Mr. Headley, but he did not so testify. The court finds that the parties never 
talked about him being the owner. The court finds that Rayma Percell did not agree to sell the 
Tractor to him. 7 re eo nit finds evidence, that Mr. Headley may have spent substantial sums of 
money on the muimeimnee of the Tractor, but does not change or establish a transfer of 
ownership. The coun tir.as that the Tractor belongs to the estate of Rayma Percell. 
WHEREfOxE: 
Having mace the toregoing findings of fact, it is ordered that the guns and the Tractor be 
transferred to Dmm Lonman, personal representative of the estate of Rayma Percell. The parties 
have agreed thai me transfer of the respective property on each list shall be done on Saturday the 
25th day of June. 2011 a: me Gaylen Headley properties on Cadillac Ranch. 
Chrisii 
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